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Migration is one response to climatic stress and shocks. In this article, we review the recent literature 
across various disciplines on the effects of climate change on migration. We explore key features of the 
relationship between climate change and migration, distinguishing between fast onset and slow onset 
climatic events and examining the causes of heterogeneity in migratory responses to climate events. We 
also seek to shed light on the interactions between different types of adaptation to climate events as well 
as the mechanisms underlying the relationship between climate change and migration. Based on our 
review of the existing literature, we identify gaps in the literature, present some general policy 
recommendations and priorities for research on climate-induced migration. 
Jel code: R23; F22; Q54 
Keywords: Migration; Climate Change; Adaptation 
INTRODUCTION 
In the coming decades, hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people will be exposed to the impacts of 
anthropogenic climate change (hereafter referred to simply as ‘climate change’) (IPCC, 2018). Aside from 
the increase in average temperature and changes in precipitation patterns, rising sea levels and extreme 
weather events, such as heatwaves, droughts and floods, will increasingly become the norm (Jones and 
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O’Neill, 2016). These trends will in turn have serious impacts on water supply, crop production, health, and 
economic growth, with some parts of the world much more affected than others (IPCC, 2014). One 
response is for people to adapt to these events and their impacts through migration. In both the ancient 
and more recent history of human civilizations, examples abound in which people responded to extreme 
weather conditions by moving out of one region and into another (Romm, 2011, Marris, 2014). However, 
although migration may offer an important option for adapting, vulnerability to climate change does not 
necessarily lead to a higher probability of migration. As we will discuss, under some circumstances, climate 
change may actually constrain migration.  
In the recent years, the influence of climate change on migration has been investigated by a growing body 
of literature. However, a complete understanding of the complex relationship between climate change and 
migration is far from being reached. There is no unified theoretical approach as yet which adequately 
represents the relationship between climate change and migration. For example, climate variability is 
distinct from climate change and the responses to the two phenomena are also different. Migration can be 
driven by slow-onset events, like warming, droughts and land degradation, as well as by fast-onset events 
like floods, storms and hurricanes, and the migration outcomes of slow onset events differ from the 
outcomes of slow-onset events. Moreover, migration can take many forms, ranging from internal to 
international and from seasonal displacement to permanent resettlement. At the same time, the causes of 
migration are highly contextual, depending on migration history and the dynamics of economic, political, 
demographic, social and environmental factors at the origin and destination (Black et al., 2011; Martin et 
al., 2014). Another difficulty is related to the fact that short term responses to climatic drivers differs from 
long term responses and this makes it difficult to generate migration projections.  
In the context of climate-induced migration there are also issues that have strong policy implications and at 
the same time received little systematic discussion in the literature. Migration is only one of the possible 
adaptation strategies to climate change. On-farm adaptation, informal credit (from participation to risk-
sharing networks) and social protection policies are possible ways to adapt, and these forms of adaptation 
can both complement or substitute for migration when a climate shock occurs. Moreover, different 
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mechanisms may explain why climate change translates into migration. Climate change can affect income 
differentials between origin and destination countries, can increase economic uncertainty, or can influence 
socio-political factors. All these factors can in turn contribute to increase or lower the probability of 
migrating.  
The purpose of this article is to examine the literature within various disciplines in order to advance our 
understanding of the complex relationship between climate change and migration. To this end, the paper is 
able to describe some regularities in the relationship between climate change and migration, identify gaps 
in the literature and recommend priorities for policy and future research in this area. More specifically, the 
paper will assess the empirical evidence on the effects of different types of climatic events on different 
types of migration; it will examine the causes of heterogeneity in migratory responses to climate events; it 
will shed light on the interactions between different types of adaptation to climate events as well as the 
mechanisms underlying the relationship.  
LINKS BETWEEN CLIMATE DRIVERS AND MIGRATION 
Different types of events are connected to climate change and different forms of migration exist. In this 
section we will synthesize the state of knowledge to better understand the impacts of different climatic 
drivers on migration and discuss projections of future migration.  The literature on the links between 
climate change and migration often distinguishes between slow and fast onset events (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2012; Bohra-Mishra, Oppenheimer and Hsiang, 2014), as well 
as between direct and indirect links (Bardsley and Hugo, 2010). For example, there is a direct link between 
a climatic event and migration if coastal erosion forces the inhabitants of a village to relocate (slow onset), 
or if people have to flee a hurricane or a flood (fast onset). An indirect link occurs if, for example, warming 
or progressive desertification affects traditional farming practices and leads some people to leave because 
of a decline in agricultural productivity.1 In practice, there is often a continuum between fast and slow 
                                                            
1 Moreover, as we will discuss in the penultimate section, it has been argued that events like droughts may 
exacerbate conflicts over resources, possibly contributing to violence, which may then force people to migrate. 
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onset events  and between direct and indirect impacts and voluntary and involuntary movement. In the 
remainder of the section, we describe the different relationships in detail. 
Fast Onset Events 
It is relatively easy to identify the impacts of fast onset events such as hurricanes, torrential rains, floods, 
and landslides on migration because they manifest themselves in a brutal and direct manner. The literature 
finds that in most cases, displacements tend to be temporary and over short distances (McLeman and 
Gemenne, 2018). In poor countries, the victims do not have adequate resources for long distance migration 
(Lonergan, 1998; Zickgraf and Perrin, 2016), and the majority of those who are displaced return as soon as 
possible to rebuild their homes in the disaster zone.2 In fact, the results of research projects conducted 
around the world tend to confirm this point with remarkable consistency (McLeman and Gemenne, 2018). 
Thus, the general conclusion at the global level is that the potential for fast onset events such as hurricanes 
and torrential rains to cause long-term and long-distance migrations is limited, especially in the case of 
international migration, which requires crossing an international border. This is not to say such migration 
will not occur in the future.  
The climate change literature recently recognized that not only the occurrence of a single fast onset event 
but also its repetitions in a short interval of time will have important impacts on populations’ livelihoods 
and thus migration (Kim and Marcouiller, 2017; Devkota et al., 2017). Indeed, the impact of a succession of 
such disasters can be very different from the impact of a single disaster, regardless of their intensity 
(citations?). Along these lines, several studies have mentioned a possible link between the  
frequency/repetition of hazards and migration (e.g., Buchenrieder, Mack, and Balga, 2017; Neumann et al., 
2015), but these are not based on in-depth empirical analysis. Due to a lack of appropriate data, only a few 
studies have been able to quantify the specific impact of repeated disasters (Saldaña-Zorrilla and Sandberg, 
2009; Safra de Campos, Bell, and Charles-Edwards, 2017; Bohra-Mishra, Oppenheimer, and Hsiang, 2014). 
                                                            
2 As we will discuss in the next section, the human responses to climate change depend not only on the type of event 
but also on the availability of resources.  Marginalized segments of society tend to be immobile or mobile only in the 
short term because of a lack of resources, whereas other segments of the same society may be able (and willing) to 
diversify their income and life choices to move further and long term. 
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In addition, the way the affected populations view their future plays a central role in their decision to move 
or not. No studies however exist on the effect of expected (future) increases in the frequency of natural 
hazards on migration. Thus, understanding such impacts on migration is an important area for future 
research and data collection efforts. 
Slow Onset Events  
The effect of events such as drought, desertification, and temperature increase on human migration is 
generally less sudden (i.e., they are slower onset) than the meteorological events just discussed, and they 
are generally associated with gradually progressive departures. The literature includes case studies that 
provide contrasting evidence of how these kinds of slow-onset environmental changes affect migration 
movements. On the one hand, there are many well-documented cases of mass departures (predominantly 
internal displacement) in response to drought, particularly in Africa (Sahel, Ethiopia), South America 
(Argentina, Brazil), the Middle East (Syria, Iran), Central Asia, and Southern Asia (citations?). Indeed, 
Hammer (2004) shows that the drought in Niger in 1985 resulted in the migration (displaced temporarily or 
permanently) of one million people.  
On the other hand, other researchers have argued that the migration numbers are small relative to the 
numbers of people affected by drought, and that climatic push events are just one of many factors 
influencing migration decisions (Smith, 2001, Black et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2014). Moreover, some 
researchers argue that migration is more a function of political issues, and generally only marginally 
associated with environmental factors. For example, in an analysis of interprovincial migrations in Burkina 
Faso, Henry, Boyle and Lambin (2003) find that environmental variables only marginally explain migration. 
Selby et al. (2017) find a similar result for pre-revolutionary Syria.  
The literature also shows that slow-onset environmental events, such as drought, can also have the 
opposite effect, resulting in a reduction in migration. For example, during the mid-1980s drought in Mali, 
there was a reduction in international migration due to a lack of available resources to finance the 
migration journey (Findley, 1994). Similarly, Cattaneo and Peri (2016) find that, consistent with the 
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presence of liquidity constraints, a gradual increase in temperatures reduces international migration from 
poor countries. In another study of international migration, Gröschl and Steinwachs (2017) show that 
drought increases migration, but only for middle-income countries, which are neither rich enough to have 
insurance schemes nor poor enough to lack resources to emigrate, suggesting that liquidity constraints play 
an important role in the complex relationship between climate change and migration. Kniveton et al. (2008) 
find that ”[drought] seems to cause an increase in the number of people who engage in short-term rural to 
rural types of migration. [But] (…) it does not affect, or even decreases international, long distance moves”.  
To summarize, the evidence in the literature appears to suggest that slow-onset events, like droughts and 
temperature increases, tend to result in either migration that is generally perceived as being voluntary and 
often predominantly economically motivated or in immobility. On the contrary, fast-onset events, like 
floods, storms, and hurricanes, tend to lead to more sudden, involuntary, and short-term and short-
distance movements. 
Migration Projections 
Although the number of studies linking climatic drivers and migration is growing, there is still a lot of 
uncertainty concerning future migration flows. There are some projections, but they generally either lack a 
robust scientific methodology or ignore the multiple causes of migration decisions. Some studies base 
projections of future migrants on the number of people that live in areas “at risk” of climate events such as 
sea level rise (McGranahan, Balk and Anderson, 2007). However, exposure to a climate hazard does not 
automatically mean that a person will decide to migrate. For example, even if directly vulnerable to the 
effect of rising water levels, higher tides or storm surges, populations located in the major river deltas and 
estuaries in South Asia (lndus, Ganges Brahmaputra, etc.) and East Asia (Mekong, Yangtze, Pearl River, etc.) 
regions can resort to building sea defences. The projections of migration due to sea level rise specifically in 
certain Pacific states, such as Tuvalu and Kiribati, on the contrary are less uncertain, because in this case, 
the climate-related event is virtually irreversible. If migration becomes the only option for affected 
populations, it is possible to calculate the number of persons that will be threatened by rising water levels 
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and consequently migrate (Fornalé, Guélat and Piguet, 2015; Klepp and Herbeck, 2016; McNamara et al., 
2018). 
Some studies have used statistical methods to make end-of-century projections based on historical 
estimates and climate scenarios. In general, these studies conclude that future climate change will increase 
the number of climate-induced migrants (Marchiori, Maystadt and Schumacher, 2012; Bohra-Mishra, 
Oppenheimer and Hsiang, 2014;  Mueller, Gray and Kosec, 2014;  Jessoe, Manning and Taylor, 2018; 
Missirian and Schlenker, 2017).3 However, these results should be viewed only as indications of future 
migration, rather than accurate predictions, because they typically model short-term responses to climate-
related shocks, whereas the further we look into the future, the greater the difference between short- and 
long-term responses. Short term responses are different from long term responses. Moreover, short-term 
responses can sometimes underestimate the long-term responses and sometimes overestimate them. At 
the same time, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds not only the climate models used for such predictions, 
but also the socioeconomic scenarios. These scenarios are a major source of uncertainty for future 
migration projections because human migration results from the interaction between climatic, economic, 
political, demographic and social drivers. For example, in the future, a larger number of people may lack 
the resources to finance migration because climate change has made them even more vulnerable. Thus, 
even if accurate from a methodological perspective, statistical methods cannot always make accurate 
future migration projections.  
Rigaud et al. (2018) conduct a state of the art analysis that accounts for demographic and socioeconomic 
trends and climate migration scenarios, and project that there will be 143 million climate migrants by 2050. 
However, this projection refers only to internal migration (i.e., people moving within their own countries). 
This suggests that the development of projections of climate-related international migration is an 
important area for future research.  
CAUSES OF HETEROGENEITY IN MIGRATION RESPONSES TO CLIMATE EVENTS 
                                                            
3 Missirian and Schlenker (2017) examine the effect of temperature fluctuations on refugees. However, refugees are 
only a small fraction of total migration flows, are pushed to migrate by persecution, war, or violence, and mainly 
originate from a limited number of countries. 
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As we have discussed in the previous section, the climate-migration relationship is shaped by the types of 
climatic events, particularly whether they have a slow or fast onset and can be characterised by different 
responses, like temporary migration, permanent migration, short-distance, long-distance, voluntary or 
forced and sometimes immobility.  However, the impact on migration also depends on the socio-economic 
and political characteristics of the individuals, households, and communities exposed to the climatic events 
(Black et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2014). This implies that the migration outcomes can differ depending on 
wealth, the level of financial and human capital, gender, age, health, the availability of places to move to, 
as well as the capacity to track what happens to property and assets left at home. This heterogeneity in 
migration outcomes has largely been studied in the more general migration literature (Hatton and 
Williamson, 2006). However, the findings from this literature may not apply to the case of climate-induced 
migration, and there has been no systematic assessment of heterogeneous migration outcomes in the 
context of climate change. In this section, we examine the causes of different migration responses based on 
wealth and gender in order identify some regularities in migration outcomes. 
Heterogeneity of Migration Responses with Respect to Wealth 
As discussed in the previous section, the capacity for migration in response to climate events is much more 
limited than commonly believed because climatic shocks can increase liquidity constraints (Kniveton et al., 
2008;  Bryan, Chowdhury and Mobarak, 2014; Cattaneo and Peri, 2016). There is sometimes a trade-off 
between the incentives to move and the resources needed to do so. This trade-off is particularly relevant in 
the context of climate-related migration, with poor people having higher incentives to migrate (because 
they tend to be the most exposed and vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, with limited capacity to 
adapt), but often lacking the resources to pay the cost of migration. Thus, poorer people face a “double” 
set of risks – i.e., they are both unable to move away from climatic threats and especially vulnerable to 
their impacts (Foresight, 2011; Black et al., 2011). Whether the incentive prevails over the liquidity 
constraint is an open question that will be assessed below using the available empirical evidence.  
Some studies show that low income families are more likely to move in response to climatic events 
(Jayachandran, 2006; Gray and Mueller, 2012a;  Mueller, Gray and Kosec, 2014; Mastrorillo et al., 2016), 
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while others have found the opposite, because liquidity constraints prevent migration (Kleemans, 2015; 
Cattaneo and Peri, 2016; Bazzi, 2017). This apparent inconsistency disappears when one considers the 
different forms that migration can take. More specifically, poor families may respond to negative climatic 
shocks through “survival” migration – i.e., temporary moves over short distances (Kleemans, 2015). In 
contrast, wealthier families tend to engage in “profitable investment” migration, which involves urban 
moves, longer distance migration, or even international migration, and spans a longer period of time. 
Kleemans (2015) estimates that migration to distant and international destinations is about four times as 
costly as survival migration and is cost prohibitive for poor people. Moreover, she finds that survival and 
profitable investment migration are substitutes, which means that families migrating a short distance to 
cope with a negative shock are less likely to invest in long distance migration. This result suggests that 
future analyses should try to analyse different migration outcomes jointly and do not restrict the attention 
to either survival or investment migration. 
Because it can reduce the resources needed to move, climate change may also generate immobility 
(Findley,  1994; Black et al., 2013). The notion of ‘trapped’ populations has been used to describe those 
who are not able to migrate even if they wish to do so. However, in some cases, immobility may be a 
choice. In fact, four different paradigms have emerged to describe why people choose not to migrate in the 
face of climatic threats. Under the technical paradigm, immobility occurs because messages of warning are 
not received or a migration response is deemed to be irrational (Morrow, 2009). In the socio-economic 
paradigm, marginalized groups are viewed as less able to perceive or respond to risk (Wisner et al., 2003). 
The psychological paradigm acknowledges the subjectivity in decision-making and hence describes the lack 
of mobility in terms of different attitudes towards risk (Kahneman, 2013). Finally, under the cultural 
paradigm, culturally ingrained attitudes and norms regarding risk are seen as placing self-imposed 
limitations on behaviour (Beck, 1992; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). Nevertheless, even if immobility can, 
in some circumstances, be actively chosen, in many other circumstances it is clearly due to a lack of 
resources, as is well documented in Bryan, Chowdhury and Mobarak (2014). The findings concerning 
immobility  support the notion that people are trapped in place, and suggest that policy makers considering 
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the impact of climate-related natural hazards should be concerned as much about immobility as mobility 
(Findlay, 2012).  
Heterogeneity of Migration Responses with Respect to Gender 
The issue of heterogeneity of migration responses (and consequently vulnerability to the impacts of climate 
shocks) also applies to the relationship between climate change-induced migration and gender (Chindarkar,  
2012). For example, female household members may be more vulnerable to climate change impacts 
because of unequal gender relations, access to resources and labour opportunities, which increase their 
incentive to move. However, women may also have fewer opportunities to participate in the labour market 
than men, which reduces their chances of migration.  
Unfortunately, a clear pattern of migration responses with respect to gender cannot be designed with the 
available empirical evidence. Some studies find that female migration is constrained by climate change 
(Dillon, Mueller and Salau, 2011; Gray and Mueller, 2012b; Mueller, Gray and Kosec, 2014), while others 
find that women are more likely to undertake labour-related migration in response to environmental 
change (Gray and Mueller, 2012a; Thiede, Gray and Mueller, 2016; Baez et al., 2017a; Thiede and Clark, 
2017). As in the case of wealth, gender can be responsible for different types of migration, with some being 
more profitable and other being more survival. Further research is needed in this area, so that policies can 
be effectively targeted to address gender-related climate vulnerabilities. Finally, wealth and gender are 
only two of possible factors that cause heterogeneity in migration response. The lack of empirical analyses 
on the heterogeneity with respect to other characteristics, such as human capital, age, health, prevents any 
conclusion and calls for additional research. 
MIGRATION AND ALTERNATIVE ADAPTATION STRATEGIES 
Migration is only one possible strategy for adapting to climate change. Thus, in this section we discuss the 
broader issue of adaptation, including the possible substitutability of migration and alternative adaptation 
strategies. Migration is often considered to be an adaptive measure by those who undertake it, or at least 
as one of several adaptation strategies (Alam, Alam and Mushtaq, 2016; Bawakyillenuo, Yaro and Teye, 
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2016; Wang and Cao, 2015; Kattumuri, Ravindranath and Esteves, 2017; Stojanov et al., 2016, McNamara et 
al., 2018). However, migration could also be viewed as a failure to adapt (Banerjee, 2017), with the decision 
to migrate occurring when alternative adaptation strategies are seen as being unavailable or have failed. 
For example, Wodon et al. (2014) find that migration may be seen as a solution of last resort by families, 
because it is perceived as being more costly than other strategies such as using savings, selling assets, 
getting into debt, or withdrawing children from school.  
An alternative approach would consider migration as an option that opens up additional possible 
adaptation strategies, i.e., that it builds adaptive capacity. For example, the migration of household 
members may enhance the adoption of agricultural innovations that in turn act as adaptations (Karanja et 
al., 2016). More specifically, remittances earned by migrants may help to relax local capital constraints in 
the origin area on the adoption of innovations such as changing livestock species (from cattle to camels), 
introducing feed conservation measures, or introducing drought tolerant and fast maturing varieties of 
cereal crop (citations?).  
Different options to adapt to climate change exist and are available at both the micro and macro level. At 
the micro level, adaptation to climate change can occur through investments (particularly in agriculture), by 
seeking employment in the non-farm sector, or through informal networks (such as family networks that 
can ensure credit in case of need). At the macro level, adaptation can be facilitated through external 
policies such as food aid or credit programs. In the remainder of this section, we examine the available 
empirical evidence on the role played by alternative adaptation mechanisms at the micro and macro levels 
in increasing or decreasing migration after a climatic event occurred. Specifically, we consider evidence 
concerning on-farm adaptation, off-farm adaptation through the labour market, informal credit, 





For households that depend on agricultural income, investment in new cultivars and technology (such as 
improved seeds or irrigation) that are less sensitive to climate change provide a potential alternative to 
migration as a way to increase resilience and adapt to climate change. Dallmann and Millock (2017) find 
some evidence that Indian states that have a higher net rate of irrigation have a lower rate of migration in 
response to drought. Similarly, Laube, Schraven and Awo (2012) find that in the ecologically vulnerable 
northern part of Ghana, households with access to small-scale irrigation during the dry season have fewer 
migrants than households without irrigation access. In another study of Ghana, Antwi-Agyei, Stringer and 
Dougill (2014) report that households applying on-farm adaptation measures such as crop rotation, are not 
only more resilient to the effects of climate change, but also have many fewer migrants than other 
households.  
These findings suggest a substitutability of migration and on-farm adaptation, with families adapting 
through on-farm investment being less prone to migrate. However, this conclusion is drawn using only few 
empirical analyses. Very little research in fact has been done on this issue, as most analyses of climate-
adaptation rarely model on-farm investment jointly with migration.4 Moreover very few studies try to 
assess if migration occurs before or after these alternative adaptation strategies are put in place. Additional 
research is needed to improve our understanding of the dynamics of the relationship between on-farm 
adaptation and migration.  
Off-farm Adaptation 
Adaptation to climate events does not occur only through on-farm investments. Indeed, households that 
experience weather shocks might be more likely to increase their participation in the off-farm labour 
market, through either self-employment or wage labour (Ito and Kurosaki, 2009; Porter, 2012). This change 
from on-farm employment to wage labour often requires relocation. This type of off-farm adaptation 
allows not only income diversification but also sectoral diversification (Banerjee, 2017), which can mean 
                                                            
4 To the best of our knowldge, the majority of studies restrict their attention to either migration or on-farm 
investments as possible strategies to adapt to climate change. 
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that household income is re-orientated from being very climate-sensitive (e.g., because it depends on 
agricultural output that is influenced by climate) to one that may be less sensitive.  
There is some evidence in the literature that households migrate to diversify income as a consequence of 
climatic events. For example, Rose (2001) finds that adverse rainfall shocks and climatic risks are associated 
with increased labour market participation by Indian households.  Jessoe, Manning and Taylor (2018) 
examine the effects of temperature and precipitation on employment decisions in rural Mexico,  and find a 
reduction in (local) rural employment due to extreme heat. They also find that negative weather shocks 
induce migration to the US and from rural to urban areas in Mexico.  
These findings suggest that migration is an important income diversification strategy, that allow to make 
income more stable and less susceptible to climate shocks. For example, Mueller and Quisumbing (2011) 
find that agricultural workers who moved into the non-agricultural sector following the 1998 flood in 
Bangladesh suffered smaller reductions in income than those who remained in the agricultural sector after 
the flood. 
 Informal Credit, Participation in Risk-reducing Networks, Social Protection Policies, and 
International Development Assistance 
When financial and insurance markets are missing, as is often the case in developing countries, informal 
credit (received for example from family, friends of community members) can serve as insurance. Credit 
can act as an alternative to migration because it allows the household to maintain its consumption level 
following a reduction in income due to a climate shock. However, credit may also increase migration 
because it enables households to pay the costs of migration. This means that ex ante, the effect of credit on 
migration is ambiguous. The empirical evidence on the effect of credit on migration is also mixed. For 
example, Kleemans (2015) finds that after a negative income shock, a policy of supplying credit in Indonesia 
works as a substitute for migration. On the contrary, Bryan, Chowdhury and Mobarak (2014) show that 
credit can work as a complement to migration because without credit households were liquidity 
constrained or risk-averse. 
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Similarly, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) argue that in India, more developed formal insurance could 
substantially increase migration because it would reduce the importance of informal networks for risk-
reducing purposes. More specifically, they find that in India, where caste-based rural insurance networks 
are in place, households that face greater rural income risks, are less likely to have members who migrate. 
These informal networks ensure credit in case of need but discourage migration because individuals would 
lose the connection with the network by migrating.  
Unfortunately, even if available, poor households often do not have access to formal insurance nor do they 
always benefit from social protection policies (Hallegatte et al., 2016). Thus, social protection schemes 
must be well targeted to help these segments of the population cope with shocks. Otherwise the only 
option for poor households may be survival migration or remaining trapped in place. In an example of the 
benefits of well targeted schemes, Rigaud et al. (2018) show that portable social security schemes can 
facilitate migration in Brazil, where social security beneficiary cards can be redeemed in many urban 
centres across the country. In another example, Hallegatte et al. (2016) show that existing registries for 
social protection schemes can be used to target poor populations, as was done in the Philippines after 
Typhoon Yolanda in 2013.  
Governments can offer assistance or transfer compensation payments to regions affected by natural 
disasters or extreme weather events, which may alleviate the economic impact of such shocks. In this case, 
the issue of effective targeting is less of a problem, since the assistance is directed to the persons hit by the 
shock. The empirical evidence suggests that this type of assistance reduces migration of the affected 
population. For example, Paul (2005) finds that government disaster aid to areas affected by a 2004 
tornado in north-central Bangladesh reduced the migration response. Similarly, Mueller, Gray and Kosec 
(2014) find that floods in rural Pakistan have little impact on internal migration, and suggest that this 
finding may be due to relief programs being directed to flood victims. Chort and de la Ruppelle (2017) find 
that although precipitation shortages increase undocumented migration from Mexico to the U.S., Mexican 
states with higher payments from a national fund providing assistance related to natural disasters 
experienced reduced migration to the United States.  
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International development assistance can also mitigate the migration response to climate shocks. For 
example, in a study of seven Latin American and Caribbean countries, Baez et al. (2017b) find some 
evidence that official development assistance may have reduced youth migration induced by drought.  
One of the most common assistance schemes is food aid. Although there is some evidence that food aid 
can delay migration (Meze-Hausken, 2000), unfortunately, there is no detailed quantitative analysis of the 
potential substitutability or complementarity of food-for-work and free food aid programs and migration. 
Further research is needed in order to draw firm conclusions. 
MECHANISMS: FROM CLIMATIC CHANGE TO MIGRATION 
The majority of studies seek to examine whether climate influences migration; very few contributions 
examine why and how climate change may affect migration.  As outlined at the beginning of this article, 
climate change can have a direct or an indirect effect on migration. Hurricanes, torrential rains, floods, and 
landslides have a direct effect on migration because they manifest themselves in a direct manner. In this 
case, there is no need to discuss why climate change affects migration. On the contrary, events like 
warming, progressive desertification, and droughts do not exert a direct effect on migration. In this case, 
understanding the mechanisms requires an understanding of how climatic events affect other drivers of 
migration, such as the economic and socio-political drivers. In this last section we review the evidence on 
the mechanisms underlying the relationship between climate change and migration. To respond to this 
question, which has been little researched, we will focus on the sensitivity of economic and socio-political 
drivers to climate change. 
Sensitivity of Economic Drivers of Migration to Climate Change 
One of the key drivers of migration that is affected by climate change is economic.  Lilleør and Van den 
Broeck (2011) suggest that two of the economic drivers of migration -- income differentials (differences in 
the return to labour between origin and destination) and income variability (fluctuations in income over 
time) -- may be sensitive to changes in climate. We examine the empirical evidence in the literature that 
gives support to this hypothesis.  
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Barrios, Bertinelli and Strobl (2010) and Dell, Jones and Olken (2009) examined the impact of adverse 
climate conditions on economic growth. Barrios, Bertinelli and Strobl (2010) find that rainfall has been a 
significant determinant of poor economic growth in sub-Saharan African countries. Dell, Jones and Olken 
(2009) find that temperature has a negative impact on per capita GDP in twelve Latin American countries. 
These results suggest that if income in the origin country falls, then the gap between income in the origin 
and destination countries will widen, which results in higher migration. This hypothesis is confirmed by 
several studies. Marchiori, Maystadt and Schumacher (2012) show that, in sub-Saharan Africa, weather 
anomalies tend to boost rural-urban migration through a decrease in rural wages, and that an influx of 
workers into the cities puts downward pressure on urban wages, which in turn causes workers to migrate 
to other countries. Feng, Krueger and Oppenheimer (2010) provide some evidence on the linkages among 
climate change, crop yields (which determine farm-household income) and migration across the Mexico-US 
border.5 Similarly, Viswanathan and Kumar (2015) find that in India, the decline in the value of agricultural 
output related to weather variations increases inter-state migration. 
The impacts of climate change on income and consequently on migration are stronger, the higher the 
vulnerability and exposure of the origin countries to climate change, with the individuals and households 
most likely to suffer income drops being those whose income is directly or indirectly related to agriculture. 
In fact, because of reduced profitability of their lands and lower agricultural output, rural households or 
some household members may be pushed to migrate to other rural areas or to cities. For example, 
Dallmann and Millock (2017) show that the effect of drought frequency on inter-state migration in India is 
stronger in states with a higher share of net domestic product from agriculture. Cai et al. (2016) show that 
increases in temperature in agriculturally-dependent countries causes migration to OECD countries. Beine 
and Parsons (2015) show that by causing a decrease in wages in affected areas, natural disasters lead to 
internal migration (i.e., within the countries) as well as some international migration in developing 
countries. Developing countries are often agriculture dependent and often lack sufficient adaptive capacity 
to cope with climate change impacts. 
                                                            
5 However, the methodology used has raised some concerns (Auffhammer and Vincent, 2012). 
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There is evidence in the literature that income variability is another economic factor that is affected by 
climate change and that influence migration. Income variability and the risk of income losses could induce 
(rural) households to use migration as a strategy to diversify income sources across sectors and thus reduce 
uncertainty. There is some initial evidence of migration being used as a risk-mitigating strategy (Rosenzweig 
and Stark, 1989; Yang and Choi, 2007); however, these studies did not focus specifically on the effects of 
environmental risks on migration. Marchiori, Maystadt and Schumacher (2015) explicitly analyse the link 
between environmentally-induced income variability and migration in sub-Saharan African countries, but 
they find that income variability has a negligible impact on migration decisions. On the contrary, in a study 
of internal migration by Nigerian households, Dillon, Mueller and Salau (2011) show that male household 
members do migrate in response to ex ante agricultural income risk that results from weather variability 
and shocks.  
Sensitivity of Socio-political Drivers of Migration to Climate Change  
Socio-political factors may also affect the relationship between climate change and migration. For example, 
climate change may contribute to the onset and spread of (violent) conflicts (Miguel, Satyanath and 
Sergenti, 2004; Hsiang, Burke and Miguel, 2013; Ciccone, 2011; Buhaug, 2010), which could result in 
migration and forced displacement (Reuveny, 2008). This is especially likely when institutional responses to 
the environmental challenges are weak (Bernauer, Bohmelt and Koubi, 2012). For example, Kelley et al. 
(2015) suggest that a prolonged (and climate change related) drought in parts of Syria exacerbated the pre-
existing vulnerability, that was due to unsustainable land and water use practices and ineffective 
agricultural policies, which together led to migration. 
However, the idea of a Syrian “climate war” needs to be examined more carefully before drawing 
conclusions on its possible relation to migration (Fröhlich, 2016; Selby et al., 2017). Moreover, the 
relationship between migration, climate change, and conflict is particularly complex and context specific, 
because climate-related conflicts may trigger migration, but at the same time may restrict migration. For 
example, during the 2000 drought in the Horn of Africa, the ongoing conflict in the region prevented 
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pastoral nomads from moving to seek water sources, which only worsened the consequences of the 
drought (Simpkins, 2005). 
CONCLUSIONS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND PRIORITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This article has synthesized the state of knowledge on the relationship between climate change and 
migration focusing on four important sub-topics, each discussed in the different sections of the article. In 
the first section, we discussed the effect of the different climatic drivers on different forms of migration; in 
the second, the causes of heterogeneous migration responses based on wealth and gender; in the third, 
the possible substitutability of migration and alternative adaptation strategies; in the fourth, the 
mechanisms underlying the relationship between climate change and migration. Based on our review of 
the literature, in this section we summarize the outcome, identify policy implications and discuss research 
priorities in this area.  
This review has identified different possible migration outcomes associated with the different climate (?!) 
events. As a consequence of slow onset events, the most common outcomes are voluntary migration (both 
temporary and permanent) and immobility, while a consequence of fast-onset events are involuntary 
migration and short-term, short-distance movements. The relationship between climate and migration 
however is complex and depends not only on the type of climatic divers but also on economic, political, 
demographic and social drivers. In fact, the research thus far suggests that climatic factors are generally 
only one factor in the decision to migrate. Some segments of society may be able to adapt successfully to 
climatic threats through migration, while other parts may not. Marginalised and disadvantaged groups like 
the poor or women are often unable to move away from climatic threats. Another result of this review is 
that crop rotation and irrigation can partially mitigate the impact of climatic shocks on migration. Finally, 
income losses, income variability, and risks, which drive migration, have generally been found to be 
sensitive to climate change, which can thus result in increased migration.  
Policy Challenges and Recommendations 
Based on the findings of our review of the literature, we present some broad policy recommendations. 
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First, policies need to focus on both facilitating migration and providing assistance to vulnerable parts of 
the population who remain in place without locking them into areas that become increasingly unviable 
(Rigaud et al., 2018). This is in the interest of not only the trapped population, but also the country as a 
whole, especially because migration is an important engine of development (Cattaneo, 2009).  
Thus, a key policy recommendation is to increase the resilience of populations at risk by encouraging 
alternative adaptation strategies, including on-farm adaptation measures that mitigate the impact of 
climatic drivers on migration.  At the same time, by implementing policies that increase resilience, by 
increasing the efficiency of agricultural production, and improving water supply systems, governments can 
help to reduce the magnitude of those drivers (income losses, income variability, and risks) that are 
sensitive to climate change and at the same time increase migration.  
Research Priorities 
While our review of the literature has allowed us to draw some general conclusions and policy 
recommendations, it has also helped us identify important gaps, and thus areas where further research is 
needed. We focus here on six priorities. First, as we have discussed, much uncertainty surrounds future 
migration projections, in particular concerning international migration. Thus, research and data are needed 
to improve the climate models used for predicting migration and to identify the specific characteristics of 
those who will be induced to migrate by climate change versus migrants more generally. Second, there is a 
need for case studies that analyse the specific impact of increases in the frequency of natural hazards and 
the way populations respond to the risk of cumulative shocks. As we have discussed, to date, there have 
been very few such studies because of a lack of data. Third, future analyses should try to analyse different 
migration outcomes jointly and to not restrict the attention to either survival or investment migration. This 
would guarantee a better understanding of the heterogeneity of migration responses with respect to 
wealth and gender. Fourth, future research should also try to analyse additional causes of heterogeneneity 
such as human capital, age, health. Fifth, more research is needed on the impacts of social assistance, in 
particular food-for-work and free food aid programs, on migration. Finally, another important topic for 
future research is developing a better understanding of the dynamics of the relationship between on-farm 
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adaptation and migration, to understand if migration occurs before or after on-farm adaptation strategies 
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